Legitimacy in EU Cartel Control by Ingeborg Simonsson by Herren-Senn, Dorothea
Legitimacy in EU Cartel Control
by Ingeborg Simonsson (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), 440 pages, £85.00,
Hardback, ISBN 9781849460057
In her thorough analysis of legitimacy in EU cartel control, Ingeborg Simonsson
undertakes to explore the role of legitimacy in EC competition law in the light
of a redirection in EC competition policy. While the focus was previously on
vertical restraints, which were seen as a potential barrier to the integration of the
Common Market, attention has now shifted to hard-core infringements such as
cartels. The modernization also introduced a more decentralized approach to
enforcement. The author aims to analyse the legitimacy of EC competition law
policy with a view to both substantive and procedural law. While she restricts
the substantive analysis to cartel control, the procedural analysis focuses on
differences in the Member States in evidentiary standards, which have increased
in importance following the decentralization of competition law enforcement.
As a method (Chapter 1), the author embraces the view expressed by contem-
porary scholars that legitimacy presupposes, on the one hand, that the law rests
on rational foundations, and on the other, that average compliance can be
ensured by the State. She further proposes to measure her findings against US
antitrust law, which she views as a more advanced model.
Exploring the role of legitimacy in decentralization (Chapter 2), the author
takes a close look at the principles of uniformity and effectiveness in their
function as cornerstones of Common Market integration. Decentralization nat-
urally raises concerns about uniformity (or the lack thereof ) in the interpretation
and application of Community law. The author points out that a low level of
central enforcement mechanisms available to the Community creates a depend-
ence on the goodwill of Member States to ensure average compliance.
The fragmented enforcement structure calls for a rational law that can be under-
stood and applied in a large number of legal cultures.
Testing the legitimacy of the policy pursued by the EC (Chapter 3) by trying to
rationally reconstruct the law on cartels, she finds that the rationale behind EC
competition law is to generate economic welfare within the Common Market.
Based on empirical findings and economic theory as well as ethical consider-
ations, she develops the argument that there is a strong imperative for a pro-
hibition against cartels and for spending public resources on cartel control. She
concludes that the EC Commission’s policy shift from vertical restraints to
cartels makes sense with regard to economic and legal theory, and corresponds
to conceptions prevailing in society. In her analysis, the author considers cartels
as forums rather than a specific type of behaviour, and cartel control as structural
rather than behavioural. Since economic theory, according to the author, finds
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its way into EC cartel control mainly through the enforcement priorities of the
Commission, she wonders about the impact of economic theory in a decentra-
lized system.
The examination then turns to the legitimacy, i.e. rationality, of substantive
cartel law (Chapter 4). The author considers that if Community jurisprudence
has managed to provide rational law with a high level of internal consistency, an
EU-wide application in a variety of legal-cultural traditions should not be a
problem. If, on the other hand, there are shortcomings in rationality from the
start, or internal inconsistencies in the Community law, they will manifest
themselves in an inconsistent decentralized enforcement. Therefore she exam-
ines whether some central notions in EC law on cartel control have been inter-
preted in a way that is rational, internally consistent, and possible to understand.
The author finds that Community jurisprudence is confusing on the question
of per se prohibitions. Concerning the effect on trade concept, she detects a
conflict between a free movement approach and a competition welfare ap-
proach. Starting from the premise that EC competition law protects competi-
tion and integration, the author develops a deterrence-based theory of effect on
trade. She proposes that small-scale restrictions should be outside the effect on
trade concept, even if cartels or other hard-core restrictions are at hand.
According to her concept, small-scale is to be understood as not threatening
welfare throughout the EU but only locally, and consequently not challenging
public confidence in the Union. Cost aspects and over-deterrence problems
point, in the author’s view, in the direction of reserving application of cartel
control to situations in which multinational companies are involved, or com-
panies with a significant amount of inter-State trade. However, an effect on
trade should be assumed in every situation where cooperation between Member
States or between a Member State and the Commission may be expected to be
of use.
Also, the author explains, the jurisprudence on the delimitation of the appli-
cation of EC cartel law is directed towards placing it within its context within
the Treaty, rather than based on a deterrence concept. And finally, the law on
responsibility for companies within a group, while essentially deterrence-based,
displays a number of ambiguities.
The author concludes that ‘jumping from one theory base to another, de-
pending on which notion of [the relevant law] is being analysed, must be con-
sidered problematic’. She urges the Community courts ‘to be more pedagogic in
order to illustrate the rational foundations of the law to all actors’.
In Chapter 5, the author turns to the issue of evidentiary standards. Following
the modernization, the enforcement of the EC competition rules has become
decentralized, but without any harmonization of the Member States’ national
competition procedures. The Community courts have developed a minimum
standard of proof which applies. National rules on evidence must be interpreted
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to fit the objectives laid down in Community law. However, variations in out-
comes remain possible.
The presumptions developed by the Court of Justice in cartel cases, such as
the opt-out principle for cartel meetings and the presumption of pursuant
market behaviour once collusion is shown, must be considered, according to
the author, as interpretations of the concept of burden of proof. The direct
applicability of Regulation 1 means that the presumptions apply in national
cartel procedures. Those presumptions constitute general principles of
Community law and form part of the rights of the defence.
The legal-theoretical basis for the Community courts’ jurisprudence on evi-
dence is still in its infancy. It appears that the courts are drawing legitimacy from
the ECHR, while at the same time the case-law on evidence may be seen as
deterrence-based. The author calls for an open discussion on the need to balance
the rights of the defence with deterrence concerns.
The author thinks that the decentralized enforcement system will fail to
produce coherent outcomes. This would be in contrast with the uncomprom-
ising requirements from the Court of Justice on the consistent application of
substantive rules, an objective that was emphasized in the preparatory works to
the legislation. In the author’s view, uniformity in substance and national com-
petence on standard of proof are opposing values that seem to be cancelling each
other out.
The author further analyses the relation between national competition proced-
ures and EC law (Chapter 6). Fundamental rights and general principles de-
veloped by the Community courts must be observed by national authorities and
courts in their application of EC competition law. This renders necessary a
comparative approach, in which national procedure must continuously be eval-
uated in relation to EC law. Such a know-how intensive exercise calls for con-
siderations about the composition of national authorities and courts. There is a
risk, the author states, that increased legitimacy through a common minimum
standard of protection will be outweighed by the new challenges faced by na-
tional authorities and courts.
The legitimacy issue is of particular importance with regard to fines and
sanctions (Chapter 7). The author repeats that laws are only legitimate if the
State can guarantee average compliance. Weak enforcement signals that the State
is not serious about the legislation and consequently undermines the law’s le-
gitimacy. A high level of enforcement signals a strong commitment. Legitimacy
is particularly important when competition law infringements are penalized.
The Commission’s policy on sanctions prior to 2006 has failed, in the au-
thor’s opinion, to achieve legitimacy; Community courts have not developed
any doctrine on how fines should be calculated.
Fines and sanctions imposed in Member States in EC competition law cases
are governed by national law. However, there is an obligation under EC law that
sanctions be effective and deterrent.
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In the author’s opinion, the deterrence model, where sanctions serve to pre-
vent infringements, is preferable to a retributive penal theory, where the goal is
to neutralize the advantage gained through the offence and to communicate
moral blame through just punishment of the offender. The deterrence model, as
the author explains, allows for an economics-based calculation of fines. By
comparison, a fining policy according to which the competition authority
must prove, on a case-by-case basis, the overcharges resulting from the cartel,
seems inefficient.
The term ‘leniency’ refers to a system according to which an undertaking can
obtain immunity or the reduction of fines in exchange for reporting the in-
fringement to the authorities. There is no indication so far that Member States
are under an obligation to introduce, or refrain from introducing, a leniency
programme with respect to EC competition law cases. However, if leniency is
employed in relation to infringements of national competition law, the principle
of equivalence should result in application of the same regime. The author
considers that perhaps a duty to design a national leniency programme might
be deduced from the Member States’ obligation to take all measures necessary to
guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law.
She also thinks that efficiency considerations should lead to unilateral adop-
tion of leniency programmes in Member States, even if there is no duty under
EC law to do so. Cartelistic practices and agreements are mostly kept secret by
the parties, wherefore only the members of the cartels themselves are able to alert
the competition authorities and provide them with ‘smoking gun’ evidence. The
design of leniency programs is consistent with the game theoretical model of the
so-called ‘prisoner’s dilemma’. Providing a direct incentive to confess creates
distrust among the members of the cartel, which strengthens the incentive to
confess. Experience with leniency programmes in the USA shows the success of
this policy.
The author concludes that while there is a high level of normative legitimacy
for efficient sanctions, there is a low level of empirical legitimacy for the actual
policy that was pursued, due to the lack of foreseeability of outcomes. The
Commission’s 2006 fining guidelines are more deterrence-based than the pre-
vious policies, but still rest to a considerable extent on a retributive theory. This
reflects, in the author’s view, at least to some extent legal theory whereby de-
terrence theory must be combined with perspectives of proportionate justice.
Although general principles of EC law (including legal certainty) apply when
Member States impose fines under EC competition law, there remains consid-
erable room for discretion. The absence of a harmonized system for sanctions
enables Member States to stick to the principles established under national law,
increasing legitimacy as perceived locally. On the other hand, national solutions
should ideally give way to allow for the introduction of the most efficient
system. Further, the lack of harmonization could give rise to indignation if
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undertakings perceive that similar infringements are treated differently depend-
ing on which Member State brings proceedings.
In the last chapter, the author draws her conclusions with regard to
sourcing legitimacy. As she explains, decentralization sought to cure two
types of legitimacy deficit. Prior to modernization the Commission was
unable to ensure average compliance as a result of its focus on vertical
restraints and its administrative burdens caused by the former notification
system. On the other hand, Member States were reluctant to take part in
enforcement. Decentralization has consequently raised expectations on aver-
age compliance.
At the same time, though, decentralization has exposed new problems.
Legitimacy presupposes not only average compliance guaranteed by the State,
but also that the norms that are enforced are legitimate.
The rationale behind competition law in general is the view that competition
is valuable to society. From an economical standpoint, competition between
undertakings on a market ensures the efficient allocation of resources. In EC
competition law, this goal is coupled with the objective of promoting the inte-
gration of the Common Market.
The author identifies a systemic enforcement deficit in EC competition law
control, which derives, on the one hand, from the fact that competition law is
very complex and requires expert skills, and on the other, from the principle of
institutional autonomy. Under the latter, Member States are empowered to
organize the implementation, application, and enforcement of Community
rules in accordance with their national legal systems, which undermines any
systemic efforts to ensure that adequate structures are built nationally. This
enforcement deficit, the author explains, cannot even be cured by an increased
rationality of the law.
The efficiency of competition law enforcement in the EU, the author submits,
should not be measured in terms of uniformity and effectiveness, but with
reference to whether the infringements that generate the highest welfare losses
are exposed and deterred from. She proposes that the more resourceful and
well-performing Member States should take a lead regionally in EC competition
law enforcement, creating a more efficient, albeit geographically uneven, en-
forcement system.
The author further submits that the policy shift from control of vertical
restraints to cartel control represented a downgrading of the integration object-
ives and a corresponding upgrading of the economic theory that has shaped
competition law (at least in the US). The author assumes, based on said eco-
nomic theory, and from the widespread acceptance in society of the pursuance
and fining of hard-core horizontal restraints, that EC competition law is sub-
stantially legitimate. She supports this view with the similarity of substantive EC
law on cartels with US law.
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By undertaking to test the legitimacy of EU cartel control with regard to
substantive as well as procedural aspects, the author has taken on a monumental
task. Discussing the rationality of the law is, of course, a very far-reaching goal,
which touches on economical, political and, if pursued in an in-depth fashion,
even philosophical aspects. However, the author restricts herself to the more
manifest aspects which arise in the wake of the modernization which has
brought about a decentralization of competition law enforcement. While it is
clear that a multidisciplinary analysis of both substantive and procedural law on
cartels could hardly have been contained in one book, her restricted analysis of
‘legitimacy’ creates less opportunity for ground-breaking new findings.
Explaining the rationality behind substantive competition law must be based
on well-known theories if new empirical findings or interdisciplinary aspects are
not included. It is not surprising that the author concludes that the decentral-
ization of the enforcement creates deficits concerning the uniform application of
Community cartel law, and that not even increased rationality of the law will
cure this enforcement deficit. As the author states at the very beginning, ration-
ality and average compliance are additional, not alternative, prerequisites of
legitimacy.
The author undertakes the difficult task of trying to find a solution to the
legitimacy problem. Her proposition, whereby the best-performing Member
States take a lead in the decentralized enforcement of EC competition law, is
interesting and may well correspond to the actual outcome, in the sense that the
less experienced jurisdictions will model their practice on more advanced ones.
However, such an approach could not be managed in a systematic manner (by
whom?) and the outcome will therefore remain patchy.
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